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THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR
INSIDE THE GRAND JURY ROOM:
WHERE IS THE FOUL LINE?
PETER F. VAIRA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The historic role of the English grand jury, as it eventually
evolved, was to act as an independent bulwark to protect English
subjects from unfounded accusations by the crown.' The English
colonists in America established the grand jury with the same pow-
ers as its English model.2 The framers of the United States Consti-
tution made the grand jury a part of the fifth amendment.3 The
purpose of the constitutional provision was to protect the citizens
"against unfounded accusation, whether it comes from [the] govern-
ment, or [is] prompted by partisan passion or private enmity."
'4
During the past decade, the grand jury has been criticized as no
longer being an independent body, but simply a rubber stamp of the
prosecutor.5 Despite the criticism, the grand jury as an institution is
not likely to be abolished because it occupies a strong constitutional
* Partner of the Firm of Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, Illinois. United States At-
torney, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1978-1983;J.D., Duquesne University, -; A.B.,
Duquesne University, -.
1 In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 568 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
2 The famous case of newspaper publisher John Peter Zenger is a prime example.
Two grand juries refused to indict Zenger on charges brought by the governor of New
York for criticizing the governor's policies. He was later prosecuted on an information
and acquitted. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFT-rAs, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL.
11 (1977).
3 "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .. S" u.s. CONST. amend. V.
4 Exparte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11 (1887).
5 See United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); 8
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIE § 6.02[1], 6-22 (rev. 2d ed. 1985); M. FRANKEL & G.
NAFTAUS, supra note 2, ch. 2. The Supreme Court also has expressed some doubt con-
cerning the independence of the grand jury: "The grand jury may not always serve its
historic role as a protective bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an




Another historic function of the grand jury is its power to sum-
mon witnesses. 7 This power remains intact today. Although often
criticized as being too broad,8 the subpoena power of the grand jury
is protected and valued by the courts: "The inquisitorial power of
the grand jury is the most valuable function which it possesses today
and, far more than any supposed protection which it gives to the
accused, justifies its survival as an institution." 9 Courts have con-
sistently refused to limit the broad, sweeping investigatory powers
of the grand jury. 10
The grand jury remains one of the most effective methods in a
criminal investigation for compelling the appearance of witnesses
and the production of documents. The author is of the opinion that
without the investigatory power of the grand jury, successful investi-
gations of official corruption, large scale financial fraud, or organ-
ized crime would be dramatically reduced.
The importance of the investigative role of the grand jury, how-
ever, must not be permitted to overshadow its role as an indepen-
dent accusatory body. A balance must be maintained between the
two roles. The key to the balance lies with the integrity and the
professionalism of the prosecutor.'"
The prosecutor's role is crucial to the operation of the modem
6 England has abolished the grandjury. Administration ofJustice Act of 1933, 23 &
24 Geo. 5, c. 36; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, ch. 12, § 113, at 276 (3d ed. 1984).
7 "[A]s early as 1612, in the Countess of Shrewsbury's case, Lord Bacon is reported
to have declared that 'all subjects, without distinction of degrees, owe to the King tribute
and service, not only of their deed and hand, but of their knowledge and discovery.'"
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919).
8 See Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (Brennan, Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting);
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22, 23, 31 (1973) (Brennan, Douglas & Marshall,JJ.,
dissenting).
9 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 253, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1933).
10 A grand jury needs no probable cause to initiate an investigation. The investiga-
tion may be triggered by tips, rumors, or evidence given by the prosecutors. Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972). A grand jury investigation cannot be enjoined. In re
GrandJury Proceedings (U.S. Steel), 525 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1975). The grandjury's
right to inquire into possible offenses is unrestrained by technical or evidentiary rules.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
A witness cannot quash a grand jury subpoena on the grounds that the witness will
assert the fifth amendment. The witness must appear and assert the privilege as to each
question asked. United States v. Pilnick, 267 F. Supp. 791, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). A wit-
ness may not refuse to answer questions on the grounds of relevance. In re Fula, 672
F.2d 279, 283 (2d Cir. 1982). Although a grand jury subpoena duces tecum may be
quashed by the court for being unreasonable or oppressive, courts are very liberal in
upholding the demands of subpoena duces tecum. See, e.g., In re Borden Co., 75 F. Supp.
857 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
11 Prosecutors have an ethical obligation to preserve the status of the grand jury as
an independent legal body. United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1983);
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grand jury. The prosecutor decides what subjects the grand jury
investigates, and what witnesses and documents to subpoena. He
questions the witnesses. He advises the grand jury on the rele-
vance of the evidence, drafts the charges, advises the grand jury on
the law, and requests the grand jury to return an indictment.' 2 The
grand jury cannot return an indictment without the signature of the
prosecutor.' 3 This power can easily be misused.'
4
The vast discretion vested in the prosecutor and the proceed-
ings inside the grand jury have received little judicial attention.' 5
American Bar Ass'n, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-3.5 at 3.48 (2d ed.
1980).
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as com-
pelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
12 United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825
(1977); 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 6.0211] (rev. 2d ed. 1985); 1 WRiGirr, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2d § 101 (1982); Note, The GrandJuiy As An Investi-
gative Body, 74 HAxv. L. REv. 590, 596 (1961).
13 Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841
(1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965); In re Grand jury Jan. 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 673 (D. Md. 1970).
14 "Indeed, a sophisticated prosecutor must acknowledge that there develops be-
tween a grand jury and the prosecutor with whom the jury is closeted a rapport-a de-
pendency relationship-which can easily be turned into an instrument of influence on
grand jury deliberations." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1) advisory committee notes (1979
amend.).
15 Prior to 1979, the prosecutor's activity inside the grand jury room was largely a
mystery to anyone except those persons in the prosecutor's office. The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure did not require grand jury proceedings to be transcribed, although
several district courts passed local rules to require recording. Northern District of Illi-
nois, Local Rule 1.04(c); Northern District of Ohio, Local Rule 3(c). In United States v.
Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 42 (D.R.I. 1969), the court held that indictments would be
dismissed if proceedings were not recorded. Although the practice of nonrecording was
upheld by a vast majority of courts, see WRIGHr, supra note 12, at § 103.1, the practice
was strongly condemned.
In 1979 Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was amended to re-
quire all proceedings before the grand jury to be recorded.
All proceedings, except when the grand jury is deliberating or voting, shall be
recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording device. An unintentional
failure of any recording to reproduce all or any portion of a proceeding shall not
affect the validity of the prosecution. The recording or reporter's notes or any tran-
script prepared therefrom shall remain in the custody or control of the attorney for
the government unless otherwise ordered by the court in a particular case.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1).
The advisory committee noted that one of the benefits derived from recording was
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This Article will explore the role of the prosecutor inside the grand
jury room, and attempt to establish some parameters for his activity.
The Article will attempt to define the gray area between proper and
improper prosecutorial conduct.
This Article also will examine the restrictions on the use of
hearsay evidence; the limitations on the use of transcripts from prior
grand juries; the limitations on the prosecutor's examination of re-
calcitrant witnesses; the prosecutor's duty to present exculpatory ev-
idence; the extent to which the prosecutor may make an opening
statement or a final argument; whether or not the prosecutor is re-
quired to advise the grand jury on the relevant law; and the manner
in which allegations of prosecutorial misconduct or other impropri-
eties should be raised.
Although the grand jury is a body independent of the courts
and the executive branch, the courts have an inherent supervisory
authority over the grand jury's operation. 16 The court has author-
ity to review the proceedings of a grand jury that it has empaneled
and instructed' 7 in order to prevent the grand jury's independence
from being subverted. 18 The court also has the power to supervise
the use of subpoenas and to oversee the general operation of the
grand jury. 19 This supervisory authority is exercised carefully lest
the court disturb the prerogatives of the executive branch and the
"restraining prosecutorial abuses before the grandjury." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1) advi-
sory committee notes (1979 amend.).
16 United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court urged
lower courts to use supervisory power when there is a threat "to the law as an institu-
tion, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of
our courts." Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
17 United States v. O'Shea, 447 F. Supp. 330, 332 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
18 United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2097
(1983); Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1977).
Supervisory authority has been exercised to insure uniformity in warnings given to
putative defendants testifying before the grand jury,Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976);
to insure uniformity of procedures for taking guilty pleas, Burton v. United States, 483
F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1973); and, to reverse a conviction that resulted from an indictment
returned by a grand jury from which women were intentionally excluded, Ballard, 329
U.S. 187 (1946). See Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARv. L. REV.
1656 (1963).
19 In re Seiffert, 446 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D.N.Y. 1978). The courts have the power
to establish procedures to insure uniformity in hearing allegations regarding grand jury
investigations. For example, the District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
has established a procedure whereby each grand jury investigation is assigned a number
by the clerk of the court. All subpoenas issued during that investigation are given the
same number. Any challenges to a subpoena or any irregularity alleged in the investiga-
tion are assigned to be heard by ajudge chosen by lot. All litigation from the numbered
investigation will be assigned to the same judge so that the judge will have familiarity
with the investigation and will maintain close supervision. See Local Criminal Rule 4,
E.D. Pa.
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grand jury20 and upset the doctrine of separation of powers.
21
II. OPENING STATEMENT
At the beginning of every grand jury investigation, it is neces-
sary for prosecutors to outline the purpose of the investigation, the
violations of the law that are suspected of having been committed,
what witnesses will be called, and what direction the investigation
will take. As the investigation progresses, it may be necessary for
prosecutors to brief the grand jury on new areas that will be pur-
sued. The prosecutors must explain the relevance of each witness
and what they hope the questioning will reveal.
22
Although there are no cases directly discussing whether prose-
cutors can make a statement to the grand jury at the beginning of an
investigation or prior to the appearance of a witness, it is implicit
from their role as directors of the investigation that they keep the
grand jury informed. They must caution the grand jurors that the
jurors alone must determine if probable cause exists, and that they
alone should make such a determination from the evidence they
hear, and not from the prosecutors' statements.23 The prosecutors
should not voice their personal opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of the prospective defendants.
24
III. THE QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES
Quite often in complicated fraud, political corruption or organ-
ized crime cases, the only witnesses to the crime are persons who
committed it or persons who have a personal, political or business
relationship with the major figures in the scheme. These individuals
are reluctant to testify, even when granted immunity from prosecu-
tion.25 Evasive answers often cause the government attorney to be-
come frustrated. Numerous cases involving prosecutorial
20 United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1979).
21 Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1977).
22 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRArCE § 6.04[1], 6-78 (rev. 2d ed. 1985).
23 United States v. Rintelen, 235 F. 787, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). See United States v.
United States District Court, 238 F.2d 713, 721 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 981
(1957) (court approved summary argument at close of evidence).
24 U.S. v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
25 Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 6001-004, permits the government
attorney to seek a court order to force a witness to testify over the witness' assertion of
the fifth amendment. 18 U.S.C. § 6001-004 (1982). The witness' testimony, and any
leads resulting therefrom, cannot be used against him. See Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972). If the witness refuses to testify, he may be held in civil contempt and
incarcerated until he complies or the grand jury expires. He may not be incarcerated
longer than 18 months. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1982).
PETER F. VAIRA
misconduct have resulted when the prosecutor badgered, insulted
or threatened witnesses in an attempt to force them to testify truth-
fully and in a straightforward manner. In earlier cases, although
often strongly criticizing a prosecutor's conduct for mistreating a
witness, courts have refused to intercede if there was sufficient evi-
dence to sustain a guilty finding.26 As the grand jury was increas-
ingly used to conduct lengthy investigations involving more
complex evidence and more reluctant witnesses, however, the pros-
ecutor's conduct came under closer scrutiny.
Courts have defined two criteria for determining the effect of
prosecutorial misconduct. Some courts have held that in order to
dismiss an indictment the court must find an actual prejudice to the
defendant. 27 Other courts have applied the cumulative error rule,
finding that the court's supervisory powers may be invoked without
a showing of actual prejudice, where the prosecutor's unethical con-
duct has become a common practice within the district or the circuit.
For example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals said that "[federal]
courts have an institutional interest, independent of their concern
for the rights of the particular defendant in preserving and protect-
ing the appearance and the reality of fair practice before the grand
jury, an interest which could justify the imposition of a prophylactic
rule in a proper case." 28 The cumulative error rule is invoked when:
"The cumulative effect of the. . . errors and indiscretions, none of
which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operated to
the defendants' prejudice by producing a biased grand jury."29
Under either standard, if the overall conduct of the prosecutor is
sufficiently egregious, courts will find prejudice from the fact that
the independence of the grand jury was destroyed. 30
The prosecutor may ask "hard" questions of a witness with the
intent of obtaining information. When the prosecutor deviates
from that goal, and uses his questions as a method of voicing his
own opinion or making an argument to the grand jury, he strays into
the area where courts are likely to find prosecutorial misconduct. In
26 United States v. Riccobene, 451 F.2d 586, 587 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Bruzgo, 373 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1967).
27 United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 941 (6th Cir. 1984); McKenzie, 678 F.2d at
631 (5th Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981), where
federal agents visited defendant after her indictment without informing her lawyer and
told defendant that her lawyer was incompetent and that she would fare better with
another lawyer. The defendant continued to retain the lawyer. The Supreme Court
found that although the agents' activity was egregious it did not prejudice the
defendant.
28 United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979).
29 Samango, 607 F.2d at 884 (9th Cir. 1979).
30 Id.
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United States v. Serubo,31 the prosecutor, frustrated by the lack of
knowledge of the witnesses, continually used rhetorical questions to
link the targets32 of the investigation to organized crime and to im-
pugn the integrity of the witnesses. The witnesses did not supply
information in response to his questions. The court found that such
conduct was egregious enough to invoke the supervisory power of
the court to grant relief.
33
The prosecutor is not prohibited from offending the witness.
In the words of Judge Learned Hand: "I agree that, when faced
with a patently unwilling witness, the grand jury was free to press
. . .[the] cross examination hard and sharp; truth is more impor-
tant than the sensibilities of the witness."3 4
The prosecutor cannot degrade the witness, and the questions
should relate directly to a fact in question. In United States v.
DiGrazia,35 the court dismissed an indictment when the prosecutor
asked a woman target if her son, another target, was legitimate, and
chided her for asserting the fifth amendment. The court held that
the examination was conducted merely to discredit the witness
before the grand jury.
36
A particularly troublesome situation which has given rise to nu-
merous findings of prosecutorial misconduct is the examination of a
witness who originally agreed to cooperate but later declines to do
so. The prosecutor's frustration with the witness frequently appears
in his remarks and questioning, which some courts often have found
prejudicial. In United States v. Samango,37 before questioning the de-
fendant, the prosecutor, who had agreed not to prosecute the de-
fendant, made a long and heated statement to the grand jury about
his dissatisfaction with the defendant's prospective testimony. The
prosecutor made references to the defendant's acquaintance with a
person whom the prosecutor described to the grand jury as being
capable of murder. He frequently insinuated that the defendant was
lying, and bickered over the defendant's failure to cooperate in a
31 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979).
32 A "target" is a person who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative de-
fendant. United States Attorneys' Manual, tit. 9, ch. 11.250.
33 Because the indictment was returned by a second grand jury rather than the one
before which the initial questioning took place, the court, instead of dismissing the in-
dictment remanded the case to enable the lower court to determine if the conduct con-
tinued into the second grand jury. Serubo, 604 F.2d at 818.
34 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1953) (L. Hand, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 907 (1954). After making this statement, however,
Judge Hand found that the prosecutor had gone beyond the bounds of fairness.
35 213 F. Supp. 232, 234-35 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
36 Id. at 235.
37 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979).
PETER F. VAIRA
satisfactory manner. The Ninth Circuit found that the questioning
was calculated to serve no other purpose than to prejudice the de-
fendant in the eyes of the grand jury.
38
When faced with hostile witnesses, the prosecutor should not
attempt to establish probable cause simply by discrediting them or
entering into long heated arguments with them during questioning.
In United States v. Sears, Roebuck and Company,39 the prosecutor ques-
tioned employees and attorneys of the defendant company in a man-
ner which implied that the company had totally failed to respond to
a subpoena. He badgered lawyer witnesses who requested time to
secure counsel. He made a long statement to the grand jury on the
credibility of a witness. He constantly demanded yes or no answers
to complex questions that were not susceptible of one word an-
swers, and told a witness that he sounded "like an Abbott and Cos-
tello movie."'40 The court branded the prosecutor's efforts as "blind
zeal" that resulted in basic unfairness of the grand jury proceeding
and dismissed the indictment.41
A majority of the Ninth Circuit found the prosecutor's conduct
"deplorable," but reinstated the indictment because the defendant
could show no prejudice which would amount to a violation of the
constitutional requirement of indictment by an independent grand
jury.42 Judge Norris, dissenting in part, felt that the lower court
should have the opportunity to consider exercising its supervisory
power to dismiss the indictment.43 Upon remand, the district court
dismissed the indictment pursuant to its supervisory power.
44
Similarly, in United States v. Lawson, 45 the court dismissed the
indictment where the prosecutor, although possessing records that
corroborated the witness' testimony, embarked on a searing exami-
nation designed to discredit the witness so that it would appear that
he was covering up for the defendant.
38 Id. at 883.
39 518 F. Supp. 179 (C.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 719 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1983).
40 Id. at 187.
41 Id. at 190.
42 Sears, Roebuck and Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1392 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1441 (1984). The court held that the constitutional requirement arose not from the fifth
amendment's due process clause, but from the grand jury clause.
Although the constitutional concept of "fundamental fairness" has sometimes
been analyzed as an aspect of due process, see, e.g., United States v. Basurto, 497
F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974), it accords both with prevailing precedent and with
the language of the Constitution to treat the right to unbiased treatment by a grand
jury as one grounded in the grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 1391 n.7.
43 Id. at 1394.
44 Sears, Roebuck and Co., 579 F. Supp. 1055, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
45 502 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1980).
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Implicit in the foregoing cases is a conception by the courts that
prosecutors in the past have taken advantage of their powerful
position with the grand jury. The courts intend to insure that such
practices do not reoccur.
IV. THE NATURE OF GRAND JURY EVIDENCE
In Costello v. United States,46 the Supreme Court held that an in-
dictment cannot be attacked on the ground that evidence presented
before the grand jury was incompetent or inadequate. The Court
would not permit a series of hearings or mini-trials to determine if
the jury correctly found probable cause. The Court approved an
indictment based solely upon hearsay testimony.
Despite the holding in Costello, lower courts have dismissed in-
dictments when they found that the grand jury was misled as to the
nature and the quality of the evidence presented by the prosecutor.
The courts have decided the cases on due process grounds or pur-
suant to their supervisory authority. Courts also have dismissed in-
dictments on due process grounds when it became known that the
indictment was based upon perjured material testimony.
47
The use of hearsay evidence, however, has presented problems.
Indictments have been dismissed when based solely upon the un-
sworn statements of the prosecutor.48 The Second Circuit, in the
first of several cases on the issue, dismissed an indictment where the
witness testifying had no firsthand knowledge of the events he re-
lated, but testified as if he were an on-the-scene witness.49 The
court objected to the prosecutor's misleading the grand jury to be-
lieve that it was receiving firsthand testimony.50
In a later case, the same court issued the following warning to
prosecutors:
46 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
47 Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Goldman, 451 F. Supp. 518
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see Adamo, 742 F.2d at 941 (6th Cir. 1984) (conviction upheld
where perjury was not fault of prosecutor and perjured testimony was not used at trial).
The court in Adamo held that if the prosecutor discovers perjury prior to trial, he must
determine if a petit jury would convict without perjured testimony. If in doubt, he must
resubmit the remaining evidence to the grand jury. If the remaining evidence would not
convict, he must dismiss the indictment.
48 See United States v. Hodge, 496 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1974).
49 United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972).
50 The court stated:
We have been willing to allow ample. . . latitude in the needless use of hear-
say, subject to only two provisos-that the prosecutor does not deceive grand jurors
as to the "shoddy merchandise they are getting so they can seek something better if
they wish," . . . or that the case does not involve a "high probability that with
eyewitness rather than hearsay testimony the grand jury would not have indicted."
Id. at 1137 (quoting United States v. Payton, 363 F.2d 996, 1000 (2d Cir. 1966)
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Although there is no prohibition on the use of hearsay evidence
before a grand jury. . . [the] extensive reliance on hearsay testimony
is disfavored. More particularly, the government prosecutor, in
presenting hearsay evidence to the grand jury, must not deceive the
jurors as to the quality of the evidence they hear. . . .Heavy reliance
on secondary evidence is disfavored precisely because it is not first-
rate proof. It should not be used without cogent reason . .. and
never be passed off to the grand jurors as quality proof when it is
not.5 1
But determining what is an excessive or misleading use of hear-
say testimony is a difficult task because each case depends upon the
individual factual circumstances. As a practical matter, the prosecu-
tor may use hearsay in many instances that are not misleading or
prejudicial. For example, a hearsay witness may report facts that are
not subject to dispute, or a witness who made an out of court state-
ment may not have his credibility seriously drawn into question. It
is a common practice for one law enforcement agent to relate the
findings of one or more other law enforcement agents when the ap-
pearance of all agents would be time consuming and unnecessary.
52
If the prosecutor's case depends upon eyewitness testimony of
certain key witnesses, the witnesses should be presented so that the
grand jury may judge their credibility. In United States v.
Provenzano,5s the court dismissed an indictment that was based solely
upon the incriminating testimony of one witness. The grand jury
did not hear or see the witness, but was given a transcript of his
testimony from a prior grand jury. The circumstance was aggra-
vated because the witness had partially recanted his incriminatory
testimony in a private letter to the prosecutor. 54 The court felt that
the grand jury was misled and should have been given the opportu-
nity to see the "shoddy merchandise they were getting." 55
(Friendly, J., dissenting)) and (quoting United States v. Leibowitz, 420 F.2d 39, 42 (2d.
Cir. (1969)).
Other courts have applied a version of the Estepa rule:
[A]n indictment based on hearsay is invalid where (1) non-hearsay evidence is
readily available; (2) the grand jury is misled into believing it was hearing direct
testimony rather than hearsay; and (3) there is high probability that had the grand
jury heard the eyewitness it would not have indicted.
United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1260 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v.
Cruz, 478 F.2d 408, 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S 910 (1973)).
51 United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1983); see Note, The Prosecutor's
Unnecessary Use of Hearsay Evidence Before The Grand Jury, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 191 (1983).
52 See United States v. Bednar, 728 F.2d 1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Rossbach, 701 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 1983) (indictment not subject to dismissal where
clear that federal agent was relating results of his investigation).
53 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
54 The prosecutor made this known to the defense attorney prior to trial.
55 Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. at 565.
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As a general rule, evidence of a defendant's bad reputation in
the community or of his implication in other crimes is unnecessary
to the grandjury. Presentation of such information through hearsay
testimony of law enforcement agents or by hearsay statements by
the prosecutor himself has resulted in the dismissal of the indict-
ment and harsh criticism by the court.56
The prosecutor has traditionally used hearsay evidence by
presenting transcripts of prior grand jury testimony. The practice is
common, often dictated by the expiration of a grand jury's term
before an indictment can be returned, or by a grand jury that is oc-
cupied with other matters. The practice has been approved by nu-
merous courts.57 The Supreme Court has formalized the procedure
for release of information from one grand jury to another.58 The
practice has some danger. The selective use of incomplete or inac-
curate summaries may void an indictment.5 9 Courts also have con-
demned the prosecutor's use of transcripts where the transcript
conceals infirmities in the prosecutor's evidence or prevents the
grand jury from seeing and hearing an important witness. 60
There is no hard or fast rule concerning the use of summaries
56 See Hogan, 712 F.2d at 761. The court said:
mhe impartiality and independent nature of the grand jury was seriously impaired
by the AUSA's argument that Hogan [the defendant] was a real hoodlum who
should be indicted as a matter of equity .... Added to this inflammatory rhetoric
were numerous speculative references to other crimes of which Hogan was "sus-
pected." None of these other crimes . . . was under investigation. . . . In fact,
there is no indication that Hogan has ever been charged with these offenses by any
state or federal body. These government accusations and others appear to have
been made, not to support additional charges, but in order to depict appellants as
bad persons and thereby obtain an indictment for independent crimes. This tactic
is "fundamentally unfair."
[ ..]he incidents related are flagrant and unconscionable.
Id. at 761-62.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Barone, 584 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1115 (1979); United States v. Brown, 574 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046
(1978); Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Gaskill, 491 F.2d 981
(8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Linton, 502 F. Supp. 861 (D. Nev. 1980).
58 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii).
59 United States v. Mahoney, 508 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The extensive use of
summaries has been condemned as a technique. See, e.g., United States v. Braniff Air-
ways, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tex. 1977); In re May 1972 San Antonio GrandJury,
366 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Tex. 1973); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Banana Industry,
214 F. Supp. 856 (D. Md. 1963).
60 Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). "The use of summaries allows the
government to present evidence which 'appears smooth, well integrated and consistent
in all respects. . . . [G]rand jurors do not hear cases with the rough edges that result
from the often halting, inconsistent and incomplete testimony of honest observers of
events.'" Mahoney, 508 F. Supp. at 266 (quoting United States v. Arcuri, 282 F. Supp.
347, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 1968)).
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of prior grand jury transcripts. As a rule, any key witnesses should
be brought before the new grand jury, especially if there is some
credibility problem that could be solved by their appearance and by
giving the grand jury the opportunity to ask questions. If the tran-
scripts are lengthy, they should be summarized by a witness. 61 This
practice is preferred to presenting the grand jury with volumes of
transcripts and expecting all twenty-three members to study them in
the short span of a grand jury session.
The problems with transcripts of prior grand jury proceedings
are illustrated in United States v. Gallo,62 where the prosecutor
presented the grand jury with a superceding 63 indictment to correct
certain legal problems in the prior indictment. The grand jury was
not the same one that returned the first indictment. The evidence
presented consisted only of transcripts of the testimony of the wit-
nesses before the first grand jury. The prosecutor did not tell the
grand jury that the testimony of a key witness included in the tran-
script contained some contradictory statements as to crucial events.
The grand jury which returned the first indictment had been aware
of the problems and had seen and heard the witness. The prosecu-
tor did not give the second grand jury any guidance as to use of the
transcript. The court faulted the prosecutor for not informing the
grand jury that the witness was available and could be called to tes-
tify if the grand jury wished to hear him. The court held that, at a
minimum, the prosecutor should have given the grand jury some
direction as to how to use the transcripts.
64
The Ninth Circuit dismissed an indictment under similar factual
circumstances, 65 but reversed the dismissal of an indictment in an-
other case where the transcripts were read aloud and the grand jury
was made aware of the prior inconsistent statements of the
witnesses. 66
The prosecutor must take a common sense approach to the
presentation of grand jury evidence. He must insure that there is
credible evidence on each element of the offense. If a certain ele-
ment depends upon a key witness, he should present that witness,
especially if the witness has credibility problems. The prosecutor
also should advise the grand jury that they have the right to call
61 See Linton, 502 F. Supp. 861 (D. Nev. 1980).
62 394 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1975).
63 The procedure whereby the prosecutor submits a revised indictment to the grand
jury, making substantive changes in the original charges, or adding new charges.
64 Gallo, 394 F. Supp. at 315.
65 Samango, 607 F.2d at 881.
66 Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1311.
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witnesses not heard, or to recall witnesses, and he should give the
jurors the opportunity to do so. Presenting witnesses to the grand
jury, making the jurors aware of their past convictions and all
promises and rewards granted to them by the prosecutor in return
for their testimony, will reduce the likelihood of misconduct
charges.
There should be a practical approach to the presentation of
hearsay. Hearsay is relied upon by government and business lead-
ers every day to conduct sensitive and important transactions. The
weight given to the hearsay varies with the nature of the source of
the information and the transaction for which it is used. The prose-
cutor should determine the necessity of the use of hearsay in the
same manner. To be admissible, hearsay should meet the following
standard: would a reasonable person rely upon the hearsay in con-
ducting the major affairs of his or her own life?
V. PROSECUTOR'S DuTy TO PRESENT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
The prosecutor is not required to search for or submit to the
grand jury evidence favorable to the defendant or negating guilt.6
7
He is not required to call to the grand jury's attention "every con-
ceivable discrepancy" in the government's proof.68 Nor is he re-
quired to present evidence which would merely raise issues of
credibility or evidence that would not cause a grand jury to refrain
from indicting.69 If, however, the prosecutor is aware of any sub-
stantial evidence negating guilt, and the presentation of the evi-
dence might reasonably be expected to cause the grand jury not to
indict the defendant, the prosecutor must present that evidence.7 0
Thus, the prosecutor has a great deal of discretion. Courts
have ruled, however, that to require the prosecutor to present all
evidence that negates culpability or bears upon the credibility of wit-
nesses would turn the grand jury into a mini-trial and away from its
function of determining probable cause.7
1
Although the prosecutor need not search for every available bit
of evidence favorable to the potential defendant, what if the poten-
67 United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1979).
68 United States v. Litman, 547 F. Supp. 645, 649 (W.D. Pa. 1982), af'd, 661 F.2d 17
(3d Cir. 1981).
69 United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979
(1979); United States v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 796, 804 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
70 Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 623; United States v. Boffa, 89 F.R.D. 523, 530 (D. Del.
1981).
71 Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 622; Litman, 547 F. Supp. at 649.
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tial defendant specifically submits the names of several witnesses
who he contends will give evidence favorable to him? Some courts
have found that potential defendants or other parties have no right
to testify before a grand jury.72 Recently, the Department ofJustice
revised its policy to require that a potential defendant be notified of
his right to appear before the grand jury.7 3 In the future, it is likely
that a potential defendant's reasonable and specific request that cer-
tain witnesses be allowed to testify on his behalf will be granted.
If the prosecutor does accede to the defendant's request, he
need not present the exculpatory material in the manner requested
by the defendant. All that is required is that the prosecutor make
the evidence known to the grandjury. 74 In any event, the grand jury
should be told that it has the power to call any of the witnesses that
are alleged to have exculpatory evidence.
75
VI. SUMMARY ARGUMENT
The grand jury investigation may last months, and often more
than a year. During the course of the investigation the grand jury
may hear numerous witnesses and view hundreds of documents. At
the close of the investigation, if the prosecutor decides to seek an
indictment, there is a need to summarize the vast amount of evi-
dence so that the jury will understand the relevance of the witnesses
and the documents. Although there is very little case law on the
subject, sound logic dictates that the prosecutor be permitted to
summarize the evidence. In United States v. United States District
Court,7 6 the Fourth Circuit approved the prosecutor's summarizing
the evidence. The court quoted with approval an opinion written by
Judge August Hand:
If in a complicated case he [the prosecutor] were not allowed to
show the grand jurors the bearing of the evidence upon the alleged
violation of the statute, they would certainly be confused as to the en-
tire situation. Even a trained judge is often unable to understand the
bearing of relevant testimony without the aid of counsel. Asking the
grand jury to find an indictment is but putting in words what every act
72 See United States v. Smith, 552 F.2d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 861 (1975); United States v.
Fitch, 472 F.2d 548, 549 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 954 (1973); Gollaher v. United
States, 419 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969); Directory Services,
Inc. v. United States, 353 F.2d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1965).
73 United States Attorneys' Manual tit. 9, ch. 11.263.
74 In United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 532 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
aff'd, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983) (prosecutor called seven witnesses suggested by de-
fendant and presented affidavits of nine others), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2344 (1984).
75 See Galo, 394 F. Supp. at 315.
76 238 F.2d 713, 721 (4th Cir. 1956).
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of the government, and its representatives, means and is well known to
mean. What reasonable objection can be urged against allowing the
man who has prepared the case to refresh the recollection of the grand
jurors by summarizing the evidence taken, perhaps, over weeks or
months, and reading from the minutes and giving them a list of the
names of the persons charged with the crime? Any objection is really,
if not ostensibly, based on the supposition that grand juries are devoid
of all independence and prosecuting officers are either tyrannical or
dishonest.
77
The prosecutor must not deviate from a factual presentation. He
must refrain from giving his personal opinion as to whether there is
probable cause to indict.
78
VII. ADVICE AS TO THE LAW
Another area that has received little judicial attention is the in-
struction of the grand jury on the applicable law. If the jurors must
decide whether or not there is probable cause that the defendant
violated a federal statute, how much instruction must the grand jury
receive on the nature of the crime involved?
Since the purpose of the grand jury is to determine if probable
cause exists, courts are hesitant to place upon the grand jury the
same requirements for instruction as that of a petit jury. For exam-
ple, one court has held that an incorrect instruction on the law will
not void an indictment by the grand jury.79
In a recent case, 80 the Ninth Circuit refused to dismiss an in-
dictment because the grand jury was not instructed on the applica-
ble law. The court said: "[The] indictment is normally prepared by
the prosecutor, who is presumably acquainted with the 'applicable
law.' . . . We are not persuaded that the Constitution imposes
the additional requirement that grand jurors receive legal
instructions.
' 8 1
Courts will not presume that the grand jury received inade-
quate instruction.8 2 A mere speculation of irregularity will not suf-
fice to cause the court to examine the grand jury transcript.83 In
United States v. Hart,84 the court found that the indictment returned
by the grand jury which listed the elements of the crime indicated
77 United States District Court, 238 F.2d at 721 (quoting Rintelen, 235 F. at 791).
78 McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1982).
79 See United States v. Felice, 481 F. Supp. 79, 82 (N.D. Ohio 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d
276 (6th Cir. 1979).
80 United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981).
81 Id. at 1347.
82 United States v. Hart, 513 F. Supp. 657, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 659.
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that the grand jury was aware of the legal requirements of the
statute.
There should be a basic requirement that the grand jury receive
some direction as to what law is alleged to have been violated, with-
out requiring that the grand jury receive instructions as complete as
those given a petit jury. The modem federal grand jury deals with
complicated violations such as income tax evasion,85 mail86 and wire
fraud,87 and violations of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO),88 the Hobbs Act,89 the Extortionate Credit
Transactions Act,90 and the antitrust laws. 9 1 Unlike common law
crimes such as murder, robbery, rape, or arson which are easily
comprehended by laymen, these federal crimes are created by stat-
ute and contain terms that must be defined before they can be ap-
plied intelligently. Without at least a basic explanation of the terms,
even a lawyer in some instances would have difficulty applying some
of the statutes.92 Courts have approved both the prosecutor's
85 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982).
86 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
87 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
88 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
89 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982).
90 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-94 (1982).
91 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (1982).
92 For example, consider reading any of the following statutes to the grand jury with-
out any explanation:
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud):
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter,
give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit
or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article,. . . for the purpose of exe-
cuting such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction
thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom
it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud):
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign com-
merce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 892 (loan sharking):
(a) Whoever makes any extortionate extension of credit, or conspires to do so,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both.
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giving the grand jury the elements of the offense 93 and reading the
statute involved.
94
The courts have not completely faced the problem. A simple
solution would be for the courts in each judicial district to approve a
unified procedure for advising the grand jury on the law to be fol-
lowed in all cases. That procedure could take the form of reading
the statute involved if it were not a complex violation, or reading the
necessary elements of the crime from any approved treatise on in-
structions. This procedure would assure that the grand jury re-
ceives an adequate instruction so that it can carry out its function of
determining probable cause, and would reduce claims that the
grand jury was misled by the prosecutor.
VIII. RAISING THE ISSUE o1v GRAND JURY ABUSE
Following the indictment, if the attorney for the defendant sus-
pects that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred during the investi-
gation, he must sufficiently raise the issue in order to be permitted
to examine the transcripts to prove his claim. Courts consistently
have refused to release the transcripts of the grand jury on a mere
allegation, requiring instead that the defendant show particularized
need for the release of the transcripts.9 5
18 U.S.C. § 891 further defines the terms:
For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) To extend credit means to make or renew any loan, or to enter into any
agreement, tacit or express, whereby the repayment or satisfaction of any debt or
claim, whether acknowledged or disputed, valid or invalid, and however arising,
may or will be deferred.
(2) The term "creditor", with reference to any given extension of credit, refers
to any person making that extension of credit, or to any person claiming by, under,
or through any person making that extension of credit.
(3) The term "debtor", with reference to any given extension of credit, refers
to any person to whom that extension of credit is made, or to any person who guar-
antees the repayment of that extension of credit, or in any manner undertakes to
indemnify the creditor against loss resulting from the failure of any person to whom
that extension of credit is made to repay the same.
(4) The repayment of any extension of credit includes the repayment, satisfac-
tion, or discharge in whole or in part of any debt or claim, acknowledged or dis-
puted, valid or invalid, resulting from or in connection with that extension of credit.
(5) To collect an extension of credit means to induce in any way any person to
make repayment thereof.
(6) An extortionate extension of credit is any extension of credit with respect
to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time it is made
that delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment could result in the use
of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or
property of any person.
93 See United States v. Singer, 660 F.2d 1295, 1302 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1156 (1982); In re Terranova, 495 F. Supp. 837, 839 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
94 See United States v. Linetsky, 533 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Slepicoff, 524 F.2d 1244, 1247 (5th Cir. 1975).
95 See United States v. Lame, 716 F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
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The Seventh Circuit has adopted a procedure whereby a de-
fendant who can make definite allegations of improper conduct may
request that the judge examine the grand jury transcripts in camera
and report if there is any such evidence. If there is evidence, the
government is required to acquiesce in the release of the transcripts
or suffer a dismissal.96
Although no other circuits have adopted this procedure, several
courts have examined the transcripts in camera, even though they re-
fused to release the transcript to the defendant.97 The specificity of
the allegation necessary to prove particularized need to obtain re-
lease of a transcript, or to cause the courts to examine the tran-
scripts in camera, is within the discretion of the court 98 and depends
upon the factual circumstances of each case.
A sufficient allegation might be raised by submitting affidavits
of witnesses who appeared before the grand jury or submitting tran-
scripts of witnesses produced pursuant to the Jencks Act99 to
Edelson, 581 F.2d 1290, 1291 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978); United States
v. Tocco, 581 F. Supp. 379, 383 (N.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Pike Industries, Inc.,
575 F. Supp. 885, 891 (D. Vt. 1983); United States v. Donohue, 574 F. Supp. 1263, 1266
(D. Md. 1983); see 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 6.05[3] at 6-114.
The defendant is placed in a dilemma-as stated by Justice Gordon in United States v.
Roethe, "I appreciate the defendant's dilemma: he wants the grand jury minutes to prove
his claim, but he cannot see the minutes until he demonstrates a right to see them." 418
F. Supp. 1118, 1119 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
96 Edelson, 581 F.2d at 1291; Pollard v. United States, 441 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir.
1971); United States v. Duff, 529 F. Supp. 148, 156 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Shane, 584 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Donohue, 574 F.
Supp. at 1268; Litman, 547 F. Supp. at 650; Sun Myung Moon, 532 F. Supp. 1360
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aft'd, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2344 (1984);
Roethe, 418 F. Supp. at 1119.
98 See supra note 95.
99 The Jencks Act provides:
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination,
the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States
which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire
contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the wit-
ness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examina-
tion and use.
(e) The term "statement", as used. . . [above] in relation to any witness called by
the United States, means-
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made
by said witness to a grand jury.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1982).
It is the author's experience that some courts often order the government to pro-
duce the Jencks Act statements prior to the testimony of the witness, or even prior to
trial. As a practical matter prosecutors usually comply without taking exception.
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demonstrate improper questioning or arguments.' 0 0 The govern-
ment should respond "not simply on unsupported pleadings but on
affidavits or other evidence tending to support a contrary find-
ing."10' A request pursuant to Brady v. Maryland'0 2 for favorable
testimony given by grand jury witnesses might cause the prosecutor
to produce transcripts of witnesses who testified favorably to the
defendant while resisting an improper examination.
0 3
Defendants may ask the court to examine the prosecutor's ad-
vice on the law when the statute charged as being violated is very
complicated.' 0 4 Defendants also should ask the court to determine
if there was any prejudicial or misleading summarization of the tran-
scripts of prior testimony' 0 5 or the use of transcripts of prior testi-
mony to hide witnesses with credibility problems.' 0 6 Although the
courts are reluctant to examine volumes of testimony based upon
conclusory allegations, there is a definite trend for courts to ex-




The grand jury is a powerful and useful institution of govern-
ment. The grand jury's continued viability depends upon the
100 Shane, 584 F. Supp. at 367.
101 Id.
102 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
103 The evidence of the misconduct in United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir.
1979), was discovered in this fashion. See id. at 814.
104 See, e.g., United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 532 F. Supp. 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
aff'd, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2344 (1984).
105 See supra note 59.
106 The court in United States v. Shane, 584 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1984), set forth a
procedure for determining whether the use of summary transcripts was misleading. The
court first must determine whether to review the summaries in camera or order the re-
lease of the summaries to the defendants. The decision to release the summaries to the
defendant turns on the good faith of the prosecutor in using summaries. The court said:
The prosecutor's burden is to demonstrate good faith in their use. This can be
shown by the existence of a very lengthy record, portions of which are not relevant
in the prosecutor's estimation to a finding of probable cause. It should be clear,
however, that relevance alone as a justification cannot be sufficient to demonstrate
good faith, for it leaves in the hands of the prosecutor an editorial decision of grave
importance. Rather, relevance can be argued as one of several factors in a carefully
thought-out decision not to transmit the full transcript to the grand jury. Further,
that the prosecutor provided the grand jury with opportunities for hearing or view-
ing the entire record, or portions in their entirety, would show good faith.
Shane, 584 F. Supp. at 367 (quoting United States v. Mahoney, 495 F. Supp. 1270, 1276
(E.D. Pa. 1980)).
The court held that administrative convenience does not establish good faith and
will warrant disclosure to the defendant. Id. at 367. Where the prosecutor can establish
good faith the court need only conduct an in camera review. Id. at 368.
107 See supra note 97.
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professional integrity of the prosecutor. He cannot abuse his close
relationship with the grand jury. He must not mislead the grand
jurors by the type of evidence that he presents or hide from them
the infirmities of government witnesses. He must not avoid present-
ing key witnesses that the grand jury should see and hear because of
economy of time. The prosecutor should conduct searching exami-
nations and ask hard questions, yet must refrain from berating or
badgering witnesses simply to discredit them in the eyes of the
grand jury.
The continued viability of the grand jury depends upon the
professionalism of the prosecutors who appear before it. 108 If the
courts are of the opinion that the prosecutors are carrying out their
duties in a straightforward and fair manner, the courts will be reluc-
tant to exercise their supervisory power to impede the work of the
grand jury. When the courts strongly suspect that the prosecutors
are abusing their positions to obtain an indictment at all costs by
resorting to underhanded tactics, or are sloppy in their approach to
grand jury practice, the courts will examine closely the activities of
the prosecutor.
108 The Department ofJustice currently has a nationwide training program for prose-
cutors with heavy emphasis on grand jury practice. This training should be continued
and intensified on the grand jury portion. All newly hired assistant U.S. Attorneys and
attorneys in the litigating sections of the Department of Justice in Washington D.C.
should be required to undergo this grand jury training in the first three months of their
service.
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